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Watson and Crick's discovery of the structure of DNA (deox-
yribonucleic acid) in 19531 launched a truth-finding mission not only in sci-
ence but also in the law. Just thirty years later-after the science had
evolved-DNA evidence was being introduced in criminal courts.2 Today,
DNA evidence is heavily relied on in criminal and related cases.3 It is rou-
* Gerald J. Ford Research Fellow and Associate Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. I thank Arnold Loewy for initi-
ating a debate on this topic and Editor-in-Chief Evan Atkinson for inviting me
to contribute this piece to the SMU Science & Technology Law Review. This
short essay is based on remarks I made in debating Professor Arnold Loewy on
the Universal Collection of DNA at an event hosted by the SMU Criminal Law
Society in October 2015.
1. See J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, A Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid,
171 NATURE 737 (1953); The Discovery of the Double Helix, 1951-1953, U.S.
NAT' L LIB. MED., https://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/SC/Views/Exhibit/narrative/dou
blehelix.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017). Actually, there is some debate about
whether Watson and Crick were really the first to discern the structure of DNA.
See Leslie A. Pray, Discovery of DNA Structure and Function: Watson and
Crick, I NATURE EDUC. 100 (2008), http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/
discovery-of-dna-structure-and-function-watson-397 ("Watson and Crick were
not the discoverers of DNA, but rather the first scientists to formulate an accu-
rate description of this molecule's complex, double-helical structure. Moreo-
ver, Watson and Crick's work was directly dependent on the research of
numerous scientists before them, including Friedrich Miescher, Phoebus Le-
vene, and Erwin Chargaff."); James Watson, Francis Crick, Maurice Wilkins,
and Rosalind Franklin, CHEM. HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.chemheritage.
org/historical-profile/james-watson-francis-crick-maurice-wilkins-and-rosalind
-franklin (last updated July 22, 2015) ("At King's College London, Rosalind
Franklin obtained images of DNA using X-ray crystallography, an idea first
broached by Maurice Wilkins. Franklin's images allowed James Watson and
Francis Crick to create their famous two-strand, or double-helix, model.").
2., See Lisa Calandro et al., Evolution of DNA Evidence for Crime Solving: A
Judicial and Legislative History, FORENSIC MAG. (Jan. 06, 2015, 3:00 AM),
http://www.forensicmag.com/article/2005/01/evolution-dna-evidence-crime-
solving-judicial-and-legislative-history; Randy James, A Brief History of DNA
Testing, TIME, June 19, 2009; Meghan J. Ryan, Miranda's Truth: The Impor-
tance of Adversarial Testing and Dignity in Confession Law, 42 N. Ky. L. REV.
413, 427-28 (2017).
3. See Calandro, supra note 2; Ryan, supra note 2, at 427-28; see also Maryland
v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013) (stating that "[t]he advent of DNA tech-
nology is one of the most significant scientific advancements of our era" and
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tinely introduced in murder and rape cases as evidence of guilt;4 DNA
databases have grown as even arrestees have been required to surrender DNA
samples;5 and this evidence has been used to exonerate hundreds of con-
victed individuals.6 DNA evidence is generally revered as the "gold stan-
dard" in criminal cases7 because, unlike eyewitness testimony, bite-mark
evidence, hair analysis, and the like, it is considered nearly infallible.8 This
potency of DNA evidence has led to suggestions that we, as a nation, should
that "the utility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system is already
undisputed").
4. Although DNA is a powerful tool in achieving criminal convictions, it seems
that DNA is employed in this way in fewer cases than most people think. See
NAT'L ACAD. ScI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE: A PATH FORWARD 41
(2009) (stating that "DNA evidence comprises only about 10 percent of case
work"); Keith O'Brien, The Case Against Evidence, BosTON.coM, Nov. 7,
2010, http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2010/11/07/thecase
-against-evidence/. This stems from a number of factors, including the lack of
discovered DNA evidence at crime scenes and a backlog in forensic laborato-
ries analyzing DNA samples. See W. Mark Dale et al., DNA Forensics: Ex-
panding Uses and Information Sharing, SEARCH (Sept. 2006), https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dnaf.pdf; Joseph Peterson et al., The Role and
Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal Justice Process 9, 122-23 (Sept.
2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/231977.pdf. There are very
few statistics on how regularly DNA is used to achieve convictions, though.
See Peterson et al., supra, at 7.
5. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (upholding the practice of taking a DNA sample
from an arrestee-using a buccal swab-during a "routine booking
procedure").
6. See Exonerations Detail List, NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (last visited Mar.
30, 2017).
7. DONALD E. SHELTON, FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE: CAN THE LAW KEEP UP
WITH SCIENCE? 190 (2012); Michael Lynch, God's Signature: DNA Profiling,
the New Gold Standard in Forensic Science, 27 ENDEAVOR 93, 93-94, 96-97
(2003); see NAT'L ACAD. Sci., supra note 4, at 130 ("Although the forensic use
of nuclear DNA is barely 20 years old, DNA typing is now universally recog-
nized as the standard against which many other forensic individualization tech-
niques are judged.").
8. See generally NAT'L ACAD. SCI., supra note 4 (examining the generally un-
scientific nature of most forensic science disciplines but highlighting the gen-
eral reliability of DNA evidence). For a discussion of the unreliability of
eyewitness testimony, see generally ELIZABETH F. LOFruS ET AL., EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (5th ed. 2013). For discussion of the pitfalls
of numerous forensic science disciplines, see generally NAT'L ACAD. SC.,
supra note 4, and Meghan J. Ryan & John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the
Tools of Wrongful Conviction, 68 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2015).
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magnify the power of DNA by increasing the size of DNA databases.9 Sev-
eral of these proposals have gone so far as to propose that we should collect
DNA from every single Americanio-that there should be universal collec-
tion of DNA.II
This article explains that, while the universal collection of DNA may be
alluring, it imposes greater privacy burdens than typically suggested and may
be less useful than one might imagine. Depending on whether individuals'
DNA profiles or samples are stored, and how they are analyzed, this may
potentially provide the government-and other actors-with an unprece-
dented amount of private information about ordinary Americans. Further, be-
cause we live in a system with limited resources, investing in the universal
collection of DNA will likely result in scaling down law enforcement re-
sources elsewhere, such as by reducing the number of professional crime
scene investigators or police officers on the street. These accompanying
events will likely detract from any anticipated increase in crime-solving re-
sulting from the universal collection of DNA and will likely overcome any
progress made on that front.
I. . THE ARGUMENT FOR UNIVERSAL COLLECTION OF DNA
Arguments in support of the universal collection of DNA generally
emerge out of the confidence in truth-finding that DNA evidence inspires.12
9. See generally Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection of
DNA, 48 TEX. TECH L. REv. 261, 267 (2015) ("Because the universal, compul-
sory collection of DNA does not involve a search, and because, in any event, it
is reasonable, it should be allowed and encouraged. It would make a better,
safer world for all of us."); Andrea Roth, Maryland v. King and the Wonderful,
Horrible DNA Revolution in Law Enforcement, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 295,
308-09 (2013) (conditionally arguing that a universal DNA database would be
useful-that it would solve issues of racial disparity and could improve crime-
solving); Akhil Reed Amar, A Search for Justice in Our Genes, N.Y. TIMES
(May 7, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/07/opinion/a-search-for-jus
tice-in-our-genes.html (stating that, "once [certain] protections are in place, it
makes sense to include all citizens in the database"); Eric Posner, The Mother
of DNA Databases, SLATE (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
and-politics/view from chicago/2013/03/dna at the-supreme courtthecase
for a universal database.html (arguing for a universal DNA database).
10. By employing the term "American," I do not necessarily mean to exclude for-
eigners on American soil. The proposals generally do not detail who exactly
would be swept up in the universal collection of DNA.
11. See supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., Roth, supra note 9, at 295, 308-09 (explaining that "the DNA revolu-
tion has transformed crime-solving" and that "[a] universal citizen database ...
would promise impressive clearance rates for unsolved rapes and homicides
involving DNA"); Posner, supra note 9 (stating that "DNA testing provides a
uniquely valuable approach to this difficult problem" of unsolved crimes like
2017] 5
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Indeed, DNA evidence is broadly considered the "gold standard" of forensic
science.13 As a report by the National Academy of Science has explained,
"DNA enjoys this preeminent position because of its reliability and the fact
that, absent fraud or an error in labeling or handling, the probabilities of a
false positive are quantifiable and often miniscule."l4 Thus, DNA is consid-
ered to be especially reliable evidence.15 Indeed, it has been the basis for
convictions in numerous cases across the United States16 and is even the pri-
mary ground for several hundred exonerations that we have had in this coun-
try in the wake of putting this powerful evidence to use.17 Since we have
harnessed the power of DNA evidence, we seem to feel more certain of our
ability to get to the truth of a crime, especially where DNA evidence is
available.1 8
Given DNA's reliability and investigative power, several scholars have
argued that expanding DNA databases is incredibly valuable.1 9 For example,
Professor Eric Posner has argued that greater access to Americans' DNA
offers us the opportunity to solve numerous crimes--especially the hundreds
of thousands of rapes and sexual assaults that take place every year.20 Profes-
rape because, "[w]ith a minimal privacy intrusion, it can provide accurate evi-
dence that leads to convictions").
13. SHELTON, supra note 7, at 190; see NAT'L ACAD. Sci., supra note 4, at 130.
14. NAT'L ACAD. Sci., supra note 4, at 130.
15. See id.
16. See supra text accompanying notes 2-8. But see supra note 4 (noting that there
is a dearth of good information about how often DNA is used to obtain
convictions).
17. See Exonerations Detail List, supra note 6. As of October 23, 2016, the Na-
tional Registry of Exonerations attributed nearly 20%-or 346 out of 1,900-
of exonerations to DNA evidence. See id.
18. See Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. &
POL'Y 121, 141-42 (2014) (explaining how the DNA revolution has bred con-
fidence in our ability to make reliable judgments in the criminal justice sys-
tem); see also Ryan, Miranda's Truth, supra note 2, at 428 ("Recent advances
in science and technology have imbued us with considerable confidence in as-
sessing the truth. . . .").
19. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
20. See Posner, supra note 9; Jennifer L. Truman & Lynn Langton, Criminal Vic-
timization, 2014, BUREAU JUST. STATS., at 2 tbl. 1 (Sept. 29, 2015), http://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv14.pdf. Posner stated:
The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 203,830 rapes took place in
the United States in 2008. Most rapists are not caught and convicted. DNA
testing provides a uniquely valuable approach to this difficult problem.
With minimal intrusion, it can provide accurate evidence that leads to con-




sor Arnold Loewy has said that the universal collection of DNA "would
make a better, safer world for all of us."21 And Professor Andrea Roth has
suggested that requiring all Americans to provide DNA samples for the pur-
pose of crime-solving would have the additional effect of curtailing the ra-
cially skewed makeup of currently existing databases that mirror the racial
biases permeating the criminal justice system affecting arrest and conviction
demographics.22
Scholars supporting the. universal collection of DNA have acknowl-
edged that such widespread collection from innocent ordinary Americans im-
poses a burden-whether that be the physical intrusion in obtaining the DNA
sample or the intrusion on the individual's privacy by obtaining, having ac-
cess to, and using the information carried by one's DNA.23 These scholars,
though, have concluded that the benefits of universal collection outweigh the
burdens, making the universal collection of DNA good policy that is also
constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment.24 They argue that
Posner, supra note 9.
21. Loewy, supra note 9, at 267.
22. See Roth, supra note 9, at 308-09; cf Wayne A. Logan, Government Retention
and Use of Unlawfully Secured DNA Evidence, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 269,
278 (2015) ("The prospect [of unlawfully securing DNA evidence] becomes
especially troubling given the acknowledged racial and demographic skewing
of arrests, which becomes inscribed in DNA databases.").
23. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Le-
gality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 Wis. L.
REV. 413, 439-40 (2003) ("Despite the understandable concerns over the pri-
vacy implications of all DNA databases, we believe that a properly designed
and administered national database might well be the best solution to the cover-
age question."); Loewy, supra note 9, at 263 ("One must be cautious, however.
I am acutely aware of the potential misuses of DNA. Specifically, in the wrong
hands, it can allow others to learn of susceptibility to disease or various other
genetic traits that an individual might have."); cf David H. Kaye, On the "Con-
sidered Analysis" of Collecting DNA Before Conviction, 60 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 104, 108 (2013) (suggesting that a search or seizure could poten-
tially take place with "the collection of physical samples," "the chemical or
physical extraction and testing of the DNA molecules in the sample," "the
database entry of the resulting DNA profiles," "the trawls of the database for
matches," and also "the long-term storage of the physical samples").
24. See Loewy, supra note 9, at 267 ("Because the universal, compulsory collec-
tion of DNA does not involve a search, and because, in any event, it is reasona-
ble, it should be allowed and encouraged."); Posner, supra note 9 ("The real
justification for gathering DNA of convicts is that it gives police useful infor-
mation without requiring a serious intrusion. . . . This logic suggests that ar-
restees should be required to submit to DNA tests-and indeed that the rest of
us should as well."). Professor Loewy has also argued that the Fourth Amend-
ment should be viewed from the perspective of the innocent rather than the
guilty. See Loewy, supra note 9, at 263 ("More than thirty years ago, I argued
2017] . 7
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the physical intrusion of obtaining DNA samples from ordinary Americans is
de minimus because it involves taking only a buccal swab of saliva from each
individual's cheek or requiring an individual to spit into a cup. 25 They argue
that the intrusion on privacy is outweighed by the investigatory power of
DNA: the information from one's DNA does not reveal anything other than
the identity of individuals, and it has the potential to be used to great effect in
convicting criminals and exonerating innocent persons, serving the important
goal of justice.26 Privacy concerns, they argue, are greatly exaggerated.27
the Fourth Amendment should be viewed from the perspective of the innocent.
I continue to adhere to that view. Viewed from that perspective, universal col-
lection of DNA is a good thing that should be encouraged."). And this may
very well be how the Supreme Court actually interprets the Fourth Amend-
ment. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean of the School of Law, Distinguished Pro-
fessor of Law, & Raymond Pryke Professor of First Amendment Law,
University of California, Irvine School of Law, Address at the Appellate
Judges Education Institute (AJEI) 2012 Summit: Supreme Court Review-
Criminal (Nov. 16, 2012); see also Amy Howe, Get a Warrant! Today's
Cellphone Privacy Decision in Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2014,
5:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/get-a-warrant-todays-cellphone
-privacy-decision-in-plain-english/ (suggesting that the Court's unanimous de-
cision striking down a warrantless cellphone search as unconstitutional in Riley
v. California may not be surprising because "the Justices and their families and
friends use cellphones and computers and tablets just like the rest of us, and
they probably share many of our concerns about keeping our private informa-
tion private"). Such an approach to the Fourth Amendment would fly in the
face of the Amendment's history-an Amendment that was drafted and ratified
by rebel Americans. The Framers were-at least in Britain's eyes-criminals.
Further, this approach of viewing the Amendment from the innocence perspec-
tive poses a sorting problem: Who is innocent and who is guilty? Moreover, the
approach could exacerbate racial and other explicit and implicit biases on
which police suspicion is often, at least in part, based.
25. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 9, at 262 (proposing that a universal DNA
database should be established with samples obtained by requiring every Amer-
ican to spit into a cup); Posner, supra note 9 (arguing that taking a buccal swab
from someone's check is no more intrusive than, for example, having someone
blow into a breathalyzer). Of course, when requiring the universal collection of
DNA there may also be some hurdles with respect to effectively obtaining eve-
ryone's DNA. Individuals who are likely to commit crimes are probably least
likely to volunteer their DNA, even if it is required by law. See infra Part Ell.
26. See Loewy, supra note 9, at 263 (suggesting that the DNA used for identifica-
tion cannot be used to determine private information about individuals); Pos-
ner, supra note 9 (arguing that obtaining a DNA sample "takes only a moment"
and that a DNA profile can reveal only whether someone was present at a
crime scene, not "the identities of his parents, or ethnic heritage, or genetic
disorders, or the structure of his soul").
27. See Loewy, supra note 9, at 263; Posner, supra note 9.
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IHI. A DOSE OF REALITY FOR UNIVERSAL DNA
COLLECTION ADVOCATES
Assessing the wisdom of universally collecting DNA requires examin-
ing both the privacy concerns that the procedure would raise, as well as the
government interest in crime-solving28 that universal collection would poten-
tially further. This weighing of interests is not only prudent as a policy mat-
ter, but it is also central to the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment.29
A. DNA Privacy Concerns
The most obvious objection to universally collecting DNA from Ameri-
cans is privacy-both in terms of the physical intrusion and the further intru-
sion on individual privacy.30 The extent of the physical intrusion depends
upon how law enforcement obtains the DNA sample. For example, the intru-
sion is greater if an officer obtains the DNA sample though a venous blood
draw rather than via a buccal swab or by having an individual spit into a
cup. 3 1 The individual privacy interests can potentially be far-reaching when
DNA analysis is involved because DNA contains such a wealth of informa-
tion about an individual-from that person's ancestry or race, to his likeli-
hood of developing diabetes or certain types of cancer.32 The government
28. The universal collection of DNA could also further deterrence, which would be
another government interest perhaps supporting the proposal. This interest does
not seem to be at the core of proposals for the universal collection of DNA,
though, and it is somewhat speculative to try to assess the level of deterrence
that the proposal could provide.
29. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013) ("As the text of the Fourth
Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a gov-
ernmental search is 'reasonableness." (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Ac-
ton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995))).
30. Cf United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949-53 (2012) (applying a physical
trespass test); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (setting out a "reasonable expectation of privacy" test), cited with
approval in Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-54 (explaining that "the Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the common-
law trespassory test").
31. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 ("A buccal swab is a far more gentle process than
a venipuncture to draw blood. . . . The fact that an intrusion [like this] is negli-
gible is of central relevance to determining reasonableness, although it is still a
search as the law defines that term."); Loewy, supra note 9, at 262 (stating that
requiring someone to spit into a cup is less onerous than obtaining a DNA
sample from him with a buccal swab).
32. See Lynn B. Jorde & Stephen P. Wooding, Genetic Variation, Classification
and "Race", 36 NATURE GENEICS S28 (2004), http://www.nature.com/ng/
journal/v36/n1ls/full/ngl435.html; Kay L. Mehers & Kathleen M. Gillespie,
The Genetic Basis for Type 1 Diabetes, 88 BRITISH MED. BULL. 115 (2008);
2017] 9
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could use DNA samples to determine whether a particular person has likely
ever been at the crime scene or even to determine whether that person likely
has or will develop Huntington's Disease.33 It is because DNA contains such
a wealth of information about people that many opponents of the universal
collection of DNA are so concerned. 34 There are many tools that the authori-
ties could employ to improve their abilities to solve crime-things like con-
sistent video surveillance and thermal imaging-but we have, as a society,
opted to preserve our privacy at the expense of perhaps slightly decreased
security in some circumstances. We see this idea embedded in the Fourth
Amendment, which protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures"35 and involves careful balancing of privacy and security interests.36
In the 2013 case of Maryland v. King,37 the U.S. Supreme Court looked
at the constitutionality of requiring individuals who were arrested-but who
had not yet undergone trial to determine whether they were innocent or
James Randerson, What DNA Can Tell Us, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2008),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2008/apr/27/genetics.cancer; Nicholas
Wade, What Science Says About Race and Genetics, TIME (May,9, 2014), http:/
/time.com/91081/what-science-says-about-race-and-genetics/. -
33. See Randerson, supra note 32.
34. See, e.g., Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing and
the Divided Court, 127 HARv. L. REV. 161, 174-81 (2013); see alsoNigel
Morris, A "Chilling" Proposalfor a Universal DNA Database, INDEP. (Sept. 5,
2007), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/a-chilling-proposal-for-a-
universal-dna-database-401503.html (stating that, "after a senior judge called
for the genetic details of every person in Britain . . . to be added to the national
DNA database, . . . [c]ritics warned that the 'chilling' move would infringe
privacy, be hugely impractical and have only a marginal impact on crime").
35. U.S. CONST. amend IV. In its entirety, the Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id.
36. See Orin S. Kerr, Do We Need A New Fourth Amendment?, 107 MICH. L. REV.
951, 957-58 (2009) ("Few would deny the need to balance privacy interests
and security interests in Fourth Amendment law."); Tracey Maclin, The Cen-
tral Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 197, 199
(1993) ("Whether a particular search or seizure is reasonable is generally deter-
mined by balancing the competing interests at stake-the government's interest
in effective law enforcement versus the individual's interest in privacy and per-
sonal security.").
37. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968 (2013).
10 [Vol. XX
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guilty-to be forced to provide samples of their DNA.38 The government
argued that this practice was intended to help the police ensure the accuracy
of the arrestees' identities, but use of the DNA samples was not limited to
this purpose, and the corresponding DNA profiles were indeed being entered
into the state DNA database for the purpose of aiding crime-solving.39 The
Court held that the practice was constitutional under the Fourth Amendment,
grounding its ruling in the determination that taking DNA samples is no
more intrusive than taking fingerprints; it is a routine booking procedure.40
38. See id. at 1965-66.
39. See id. (stating that, three weeks after "King's DNA record was uploaded to the
Maryland DNA database, ... his DNA profile was matched to the DNA sample
collected in the unsolved 2003 rape case" and that, "[o]nce the DNA was
matched to King, detectives presented the forensic evidence to a grand jury,
which indicted him for the rape"); cf Brief of Petitioner at 15, 21-25, Mary-
land v. King, 133. S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (No. 12-207), 2012 WL 6755127 at *15
(arguing that "[wihat is at issue in this case is not a search of King's 'genes,'
but rather a search for his identity," that "[t]he State clearly has an interest in
knowing the identities of the people in its custody," and, further, that the
State's "interest in solving crimes"-"one of the enumerated purposes of creat-
ing the DNA database"-is furthered by routinely collecting arrestees' DNA).
The King Court suggested that entering this information into the database was
actually part of the important identification purpose rather than crime-solving.
It stated that "[t]he legitimate government interest served by the Maryland
DNA Collection Act is one that is well established: the need for law enforce-
ment officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and
possessions they must take into custody." King, 133 S. Ct. at 1970. According
to the Court, some of the "constitutional justifications" for this include: (1) the
government's "substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes
are available for trials"-that the government will have the opportunity to take
measures to prevent a suspect from fleeing because he "knows that he has yet
to answer for some past crime"; (2) "[t]he government's interest in preventing
crime by arrestees," which requires "an assessment of the danger he poses to
the public" that can "inform a court's determination whether the individual
should be released on bail"; (3) and "the interests of justice," which are fur-
thered by "identification of an arrestee as the perpetrator of some heinous
crime[, which] may have the salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully
imprisoned for the same offense." Id. at 1973-74.
40. See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1971-80 (comparing fingerprint and DNA identifica-
tion, finding that "DNA identification of arrestees ... is no more than an exten-
sion of methods of identification long used in dealing with persons under
arrest," and concluding that "taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arres-
tee's DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police book-
ing procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment"); see also Roth,
supra note 9, at 296 (stating that the King majority "reconceptualize[d] the
[state] law as deploying DNA typing as a 'routine booking procedure" and
focuse[d] exclusively on the state's interest in confirming arrestees' identities
and determining arrestees' criminal history before making bail decisions").
2017] 11I
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Some scholars have worried that the Court's opinion opened the door for
collecting DNA more broadly because the Court premised its opinion of con-
stitutionality on the minimal intrusiveness of collecting DNA and the mini-
mal information that it provides to law enforcement rather than on the
diminished privacy interests of arrestees.4 1 The concern is that, under legisla-
tion authorizing the universal collection of DNA, the government will have
unprecedented access to private information about ordinary Americans that
will significantly impinge on individual liberty.42
Proponents of the universal collection of DNA have argued that these
privacy concerns are overblown.43 Not only is the buccal swab or spit-cup
DNA grab only a de minimus physical intrusion, but, these proponents argue,
very little information can be gleaned from the DNA used to identify individ-
uals anyway.44 In this regard, proponents have argued that DNA analyses
assess only "junk DNA," which can be used only for identification pur-
poses. 45 Somewhat ironically, the proponents seeking access to the great in-
vestigative power of DNA have suggested that DNA is much less useful than
it is thought to be by those who fear that this universal collection of DNA
would greatly infringe on individual privacy.
Whether collected DNA can reveal more information than just individu-
als' identities is actually more nuanced. The universal collection of DNA
41. See, e.g., Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab, supra note 34, at
174-75 (explaining that the Court's analysis in King "suggests that future cases
involving DNA typing are much less likely to turn on the status of the ...
defendant as an arrestee than on the Court's general nonchalance about govern-
ment genetic testing"); see also Roth, supra note 9, at 296 (suggesting that the
King Court's small nod to crime-fighting-to which it "devote[d] only two
sentences"-was surprising).
42. See Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab, supra note 34, at 174-75;
Roth, supra note 9, at 296.
43. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 9, at 266-67 (arguing that assessing the propriety
of a universal DNA database involves weighing privacy concerns-which
amount to "an abstract harm"-"against a concrete good" of accurately solving
more crimes); Posner, supra note 9 (suggesting that weighing the privacy inter-
ests at stake is like "put[ting] a feather on . . . the scale").
44. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 9, at 263 (suggesting that the DNA used for identi-
fication cannot be used to determine private information about individuals);
Amar, supra note 9 (suggesting that the "parts of the DNA code that identify
individuals [do not] reveal[ ] other medical facts").
45. See Simon A. Cole, Is the "Junk" DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 Nw. U.L.
REv. COLLOQUY 54, 56-57 ("In the debate over DNA databases the term 'junk
DNA' has been invoked by defenders of the databases to blunt privacy con-
cerns. Their argument is that, since forensic STRs are non-functional 'junk,'
the genetic data stored in databases is meaningless."); see also supra note 9
(citing authors who have suggested that so-called "junk DNA" reveals no infor-
mation other than identification).
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could indeed give the government unprecedented access to our personal, pri-
vate information. DNA contains vast amounts of information about one's
identity-one's history, diseases, family, etc. 4 6 The extent to which the gov-
ernment actually has access to this private information, though, depends on
what exactly the government stores. If the government stores the DNA sam-
ple, then the sample can be tested for various private information so long as
enough of a non-contaminated and non-deteriorated DNA sample continues
to exist.47 If the examiner develops a DNA profile using just the thirteen loci
that are typically examined when attempting to establish identity and then
destroys the original sample, then only information about the alleles at those
loci will be available. Some commentators argue that the DNA involved in
this identification is "junk DNA," which does not provide any such informa-
tion-it is in fact just otherwise useless DNA that has been conveniently
repurposed for the use of identification.48 But to say that so-called "junk
46. See PETER TURNPENNY & SIAN ELLARD, EMERY'S ELEMENTS OF MEDICAL GE-
NETICS 5-11 (14th ed. 2012); David Lazer, Introduction: DNA and the Crimi-
nal Justice System, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 9 (David Lazer ed. 2004).
47. See Tracey Maclin, Government Analysis of Shed DNA Is a Search Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 287, 307 (2015) (noting that "gov-
ernment officials retain the biological materials that produce the DNA
profiles"). See generally Lawrence Kobilinsky, Recovery and Stability of DNA
in Samples of Forensic Science Significance, 4 FORENSIC SCI. REv. 67 (1992)
(discussing the risks of DNA degradation and contamination); George Bundy
Smith & Janet A. Gordon, The Admission of DNA Evidence in State and Fed-
eral Courts, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2465, 2478 (1997) ("Other problems that
may affect the validity and reliability of DNA forensic evidence include inade-
quate laboratory standards and techniques-such as an insufficient DNA sam-
ple size, deterioration of the DNA sample, contamination of DNA Sample [sic],
improper test procedures, false inclusion (false positive identification), and
false negative results."); William C. Thompson, Tarnish on the 'Gold Stan-
dard': Understanding Recent Problems in Forensic DNA Testing, THE CHAM-
PION, Jan./Feb. 2006, at 10-11 ("A close look at the field shows that DNA
testing errors have been popping up all over the country. Many of the mistakes
arise from cross-contamination or mislabeling of DNA samples."). Addition-
ally, recent research has highlighted the difficulties of calculating reliable
profiles and statistics of matches between DNA profiles where the unknown
sample contains only a small quantity of DNA. See Natasha Gilbert, DNA's
Identity Crisis, 464 NATURE 347, 347-48 (2010); William C. Thompson, Fo-
rensic DNA Statistics: Still Controversial in Some Cases, THE CHAMPION, Dec.
2012, at 12.
48. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 9, at 263 (suggesting that the DNA used for identi-
fication cannot be used to determine private information about individuals);
Amar, supra note 9 (suggesting that the "parts of the DNA code that identify
individuals [do not] reveal[ ] other medical facts"); see also Maryland v. King,
133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013) (suggesting that "junk DNA" "does not show
more far-reaching and complex characteristics like genetic traits").
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DNA" provides only identifying information is incomplete and misleading.
The frequently employed "junk DNA" label for these regions of DNA is a
misnomer.49 So-called "junk DNA" also provides significant private informa-
tion.50 This portion of DNA contains information related to the likelihood of
an individual developing Crohn's disease, multiple sclerosis, diabetes, lupus,
celiac disease, and heart conditions.51 More specifically, the "junk DNA"
currently used for identification contains information for tracking certain dis-
eases in individuals.52 Surely, there is some question about how predictive or
useful this information might be.53 But, as science and technology continue
49. See MN CHATrERJEA & RANA SHINDE, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL BIOCHEMISTRY
243 (8th ed., 2012) ("Recent studies on junk DNA by scientists have shown
that it has some essential and useful functions."); Diana Crow, "Junk DNA "
Tells Mice-and Snakes-How to Grow a Backbone, SCI. MAG., Aug. 1, 2016
("[O]ver the past couple decades, geneticists have discovered that this so-called
junk is anything but. It has important functions, such as switching genes on and
off and setting the timing for changes in gene activity.").
50. See Cole, supra note 45, at 57-60 (explaining that the DNA used in identifying
individuals may be predictive of genes that cause disease). But see infra note
53 and accompanying text (questioning how predictive this information might
be).
51. Alok Jha, Breakthrough Study Overturns Theory of "Junk DNA" in Genome,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2012/
sep/05/genes-genome-junk-dna-encode; Gina Kolata, Bits of Mystery DNA, Far
From "Junk, " Play Crucial Role, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/science/far-from-junk-dna-dark-matter-proves-
crucial-to-health.html?_r-0; see David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA
Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179, 187 (2001) ("The
fact is that some noncoding loci can indicate or predict disease states, and all
loci, coding and noncoding alike, can be used for parentage testing.").
52. John M. Butler, Genetics and Genomics of Core Short Tandem Repeat Loci
Used in Human Identity Testing, 51 J. FORENSIC SCI. 253, 260 (2006); Cole,
supra note 45, at 58-59.
53. See D.H. Kaye, Please, Let's Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revela-
tion of Private Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 71 (2007).
Professor David Kaye has explained:
Just as the argument that nonfunctional DNA cannot be a threat to privacy
is superficial, it would be incomplete and misleading simply to inform the
public that an STR profile contains information that is correlated to physi-
cal traits such as disease and possibly behavioral predispositions and
hence could be used to predict whether an individual will develop a dis-
ease. By innuendo, this formulation suggests that these nonfunctional loci,
which are very weakly associated (if at all) with disease or behavior, are
comparable to the loci used in much more powerful modem genetic test-
ing for the DNA sequences of mutations that do cause disease.
Id. He has further stated that these "STR profiles are useless as a 'genetic test
to screen for any particular disease' and that, while "[n]o one can say for cer-
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to rocket forward, we will likely discover even more about what information
this type of "junk DNA" can provide.54 The reason we look at this portion of
the DNA for identification is that it has some of the greatest variation among
humans-in some sense, this means that it can tell us the most about
people.55
Of course the fears of making this private information available to the
government go beyond guilty persons' fears that they will be caught; ordi-
nary innocent Americans are also fearful that the private information re-
vealed by their DNA samples will be misused. The information could
potentially be provided to insurance companies that might very well use it to
charge higher premiums for those with certain medical conditions. It could
be provided to pharmaceutical companies so that they could target certain
individuals in their advertising. It could be provided to financial institutions
so that they could increase one's rates. Countries like Iceland, Estonia, and
Tonga have indeed sold their DNA databases to private companies.56 Some
scholars are even worried that the government could use the private informa-
tion to target potential suspects and criminals who, genetically, might be.
predisposed to committing certain crimes.57 This seems less likely under our
tain what the future of genetics holds . . the information coded in the
databases is and will remain, with .. . limited exceptions .. . useful only for
identification." Id.
54. See Butler, supra note 52, at 60; Kaye, On the "Considered Analysis" of Col-
lecting DNA Before Conviction, supra note 23, at 118 ("[I]t is conceivable that
some of the loci in the strictly identifying profiles could turn out to convey;
disease-related or other socially significant information that could harm an in-
dividual's legitimate interests.").
55. See JoHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF DNA TYPING 28-29 (2009) ("Only a
small fraction of our DNA (around 0.3% or ~10 million nucleotides) differs
between people and makes us unique individuals.... Variable regions of the
human genome provide the capability to use DNA information for human iden-
tity purposes."); NAT'L INST. JUST., DNA FOR THE DEFENSE BAR 6 (2012),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/237975.pdf ("Each of the 13 loci was cho-
sen because of its high degree of polymorphism, meaning that several different
possible genetic types exist for each locus."); see also Maryland v. King, 133
S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013) (stating that the term "'junk' DNA" "may mislead
the layperson, for in fact this is the DNA region used with near certainty to
identify a person").
56. See Michael Gross, Estonia Sells Its Gene Pool, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 8,
2000), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2000/nov/09/technologyl;
Hr6bjartur J6natansson, Iceland's Health Sector Database: A Significant Head
Start in the Search for the Biological Grail or an Irreversible Error?, 26 AM.
J.L. & MED. 31, 37 (2000); Deborah Smith, Tongans Sell Right to DNA Data,
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Nov. 23, 2000, at 3.
57. Professor Posner has argued that this is a ridiculous fear, though. See Posner,
supra note 9 ("[T]he idea that the police would use DNA evidence of a per-
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current rules of criminal law, which generally require both actus reus and
mens rea before a conviction can be found.58
Now, our legislators could pass laws to limit the uses of DNA samples
and databases. This would certainly be a deterrent to such misuse of private
DNA information.59 But, like in any area, there remains the possibility of
rogue agents. Even if it is illegal to use the DNA profile for other reasons,
some individuals within law enforcement have a history of bending the rules.
Further, as Professor Erin Murphy has explained, "jurisdictions across
America [already] engage in 'rogue' databasing-the collection and record-
ing of samples in local and unofficial databases that need not comply with
formal statutory law."60 Finally, there is the problem of mission creep: once a
universal database is in place, politicians might change their minds about the
tasks for which the information can be used.61
B. The Truth-Finding Power of DNA
Even if the privacy concerns surrounding the universal collection of
DNA were minimal, there would still be a question about whether we should
universally collect DNA because the investigatory power of universal collec-
tion may not be as powerful as some scholars have suggested. The question,
son's criminal propensity to lock her up before she commits crimes is far-
fetched at best.").
58. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 253, 320-21 (5th ed. 2010).
59. See Posner, supra note 9 (noting that "government officials could conceivably
break the law and sell DNA samples to insurance companies or telemarketers,
or trumpet private information to the press" but that "they can do that with all
the other information they possess-from tax returns to health records"-yet
the law deters them from doing this).
60. Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab, supra note 34, at 172 (noting that
"jurisdictions across America engage in 'rogue' databasing-the collection and
recording of samples in local and unofficial databases that need not comply
with formal statutory law"); Erin Murphy, Physician Heal Thyself Whither the
Police and Prosecutor in the Tale of Forensic Science Gone Wrong?, 91 TEX.
L. REV. SEE ALso 101, 110 (2013) ("Some law enforcement officials have
assumed authority to engage in certain kinds of database searches (like familial
searches), even absent express legislative authority."). As Murphy has ex-
plained, these collections of the "'voluntary' or 'abandoned' samples' . . . have
been almost universally held constitutional." Murphy, License, Registration,
Cheek Swab, supra note 34, at 172.
61. See Sonia M. Suter, All in the Family: Privacy and DNA Familial Searching,
23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 309, 316-18 (2010) (identifying the problem of mis-
sion creep where DNA collection is involved); see also Maclin, The Central
Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, supra note 36, at 306 (noting that the Su-
preme Court Justices in King "were informed of, but expressed no concern




then, is whether the improvement in crime-solving resulting from the univer-
sal collection of DNA would outweigh the risk and magnitude of privacy
intrusions resulting from the practice and the resources that universal collec-
tion would require.62
Despite popular belief, there is a serious question about how effective
universal collection of DNA would be in solving crimes. DNA is certainly a
powerful identification tool, but this does not necessarily mean that the uni-
versal collection of DNA will improve crime-solving much.63 There is an
empirical question about whether adding the DNA profiles of millions of
Americans to DNA databases is going to improve our ability to solve crimes.
First, many offenders are recidivists, and for these offenders, their DNA may
very well already be in the system.64 In fact, there are already well over 12
million profiles in DNA databases.65 More importantly, too little DNA evi-
dence is found at crime scenes and subsequently analyzed by forensic labora-
tories.66 Indeed, research suggests that this is more problematic than having
too few DNA profiles in the databases.67 Many jurisdictions do not have
62. This question is one of good policy. In the constitutional question, it is likely
that only security and privacy interests, and not the resources at stake, would be
in play. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
63. An improvement in crime-solving could be measured by crime rates, clearance
rates, or other metrics.
64. See Brandon L. Garrett & Erin Murphy, Too Much Information, SLATE (Feb.
12, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/jurisprudence/
2013/02/dna collection at the-supreme court_maryland-vjking.html (noting.
that many offenders have prior convictions, which means that their DNA
should already be in the databases).
65. See CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVS., Codis-NDIS Statistics (Dec. 2016), https://
www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics.
66. See Dale et al., supra note 4, at 3; Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab,
supra note 34, at 181-82; Peterson et al., supra note 4, at 9, 123, 125.
67. See Jeremiah Goulka et al., Toward a Comparison of DNA Profiling and
Databases in the United States and England, 1 RAND (2010), http://www.rand.
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical reports/2010/RANDTR918.pdf (con-
cluding that "database matches are more strongly related to the number of
crime-scene samples than to the number of offender profiles in the database,"
which "suggests that 'widening the net,' which research indicates has only a
minimal deterrent effect, might be less cost-effective than allocating more ef-
fort to samples from crime scenes"); Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek
Swab, supra note 34, at 181. As Professor Murphy has explained, "[s]tudy after
study has shown that it is improving the collection of DNA from crime scenes,
not from known offenders, that would make a real difference in solving cases."
Id. In her view, "the real crisis in DNA collection is not the inadequacy of the
ten-million-plus-person database of known offenders, but that of the 498,600
crime scene sample database." Id.
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dedicated and trained crime scene investigators,68 and an increase in the num-
ber of individuals' DNA profiles that must be analyzed may actually de-
crease the work that can be done on the other side of the equation, as there
are already backlogs of DNA profiles to be tested.69
Proponents of universal DNA collection also assert that this expansive
database will help clear the innocent.7 0 But if an innocent person is a suspect
in any particular case, he can voluntarily submit to a DNA test; having the
universal collection of DNA likely will not help him. Further, DNA may be
the gold standard for identification, but it still poses the risk of mistakes. For
example, the use of degraded samples can lead to faulty "matches," samples
can be contaminated, and there is the risk of human error-such as a lab
technician's mix-up of sample-or even fraud.7' Additionally, there is al-
ways the chance, no matter how small, that a match will be reached even if
the samples are not from the same individuals.72 Finally, a matching DNA
profile does not necessarily mean guilt.73 DNA may be left at a crime scene
for other reasons, such as if the individual was at the scene before the crime
occurred. So DNA, like other forensic science evidence, has the ability to
lead to wrongful convictions.
Ultimately, moving to a practice of universally collecting DNA would
amount to a shift in resources. Obtaining, analyzing, and uploading DNA
profiles can be expensive, and we are in a system of limited resources. 74 We
68. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping the Path Forward: Toward A Systemic View
of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91 TEx. L. REv. 1051, 1080-82
(2013) ("The primary engines of evidence collection occupy the opposite end
of the specialization spectrum, as they are typically patrol officers-the most
junior, least trained, and most overtasked personnel in the police hierarchy.").
69. See Dale et al., supra note 4, at 3; Mark Nelson et al., Making Sense of DNA
Backlogs, 2012-Myths vs. Reality iii NAT'L INST. JUST. (2013), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/243347.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Loewy, supra note 9, at 266 ("Under my proposal ... the government
can learn the identity of innocent people by determining that their DNA does
not match that of the perpetrator. Surely, this is a good thing.").
71. Ryan & Adams, supra note 8, at 1083 ("Errors can still occur with respect to
DNA evidence ... .For example, laboratory tests can be mislabeled or contam-
inated, and an analyst could make a mistake or even possibly fabricate re-
sults."); Meghan J. Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 261, 274 n.89 (2012) ("[W]hile DNA evidence can be 'uniquely pro-
bative' of a defendant's innocence, it is not conclusive. For example, the defen-
dant may not have left behind any of his DNA, and the trace DNA evidence
examined could belong to his partner or an innocent individual." (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
72. See generally Smith & Gordon, supra note 47, at 2472, 2488.
73. See id.
74. John L. Diamond; The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 IND. L. REv. 291,
309 (1998) ("Obviously, the criminal justice system has limited resources.");
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already have huge backlogs in DNA testing-for cases like rape and also for
convicted offenders claiming innocence.75 So, what will imposing this heavy
collection burden mean for future police work? Will it shift resources from
putting officers on the streets to collecting and developing millions of DNA
profiles? Will police become less experienced and practiced investigators be-
cause they will now be relying more heavily on DNA? Will they get tunnel
vision and focus only on DNA even though there may be countervailing evi-
dence in a case? For the universal collection of DNA to improve crime-solv-
ing, resources must be funneled into collecting DNA from all Americans,
significantly increasing the collection of DNA evidence from crime scenes,
and carefully analyzing of all of these samples. Perhaps in a world of unlim-
ited resources, this could improve crime-solving, but in our more limited
world I wonder whether this shift in resources would be more effective than,
for example, employing more police officers, investing in childhood educa-
tion, and improving the living conditions of individuals in poor communities.
IV. CONCLUSION
DNA analysis is a powerful tool in crime-solving, but it is essential to
understand the limitations of DNA analysis and some of the complications
that arise when requiring all Americans to submit to DNA testing for the
purpose of solving more crimes. Individual privacy could be seriously com-
promised by requiring government access to all individuals' DNA. Further,
limited resources hamper DNA's power to improve crime-solving. Consider-
ing these drawbacks should be central to considering whether the universal
collection of DNA is smart policy and also whether such a scheme would be
constitutionally viable under the Fourth Amendment. More broadly, allowing
government access to the vast array of information that our DNA holds could
degrade the Fourth Amendment requirements of reasonableness. What sort of
privacy we can reasonably expect could be vastly diminished if this becomes
the norm. It could have far-flung implications for other government crime-
solving initiatives and surveillance operations.
Michael Tonry, The Functions of Sentencing and Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN.
L. REv. 37, 57 (2005) ("The criminal justice system has limited material and
manpower resources.").
75. See Advancing Justice Through DNA Technology: Using DNA to Solve Crimes,
U.S. DEPT. JUST. (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/ag/advancing-justice-
through-dna-technology-using-dna-solve-crimes ("One of the biggest problems
facing the criminal justice system today is the substantial backlog of
unanalyzed DNA samples and biological evidence from crime scenes, espe-
cially in sexual assault and murder cases."); Lab Backlogs and Untested Evi-
dence, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 17, 2009), http://www.innocenceproject.org/
lab-backlogs-and-untested-evidence/; What's Being Done To Address The
Country's Backlog Of Untested Rape Kits, NPR (Jan. 17, 2016, 7:31 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2016/01/17/463358406/whats-being-done-to-address-the-
countrys-backlog-of-untested-rape-kits.
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